Khartoum — Prepared by Amjad Sharaf al-Din al-Makki of Al-Sudani Newspaper for Sudan Media Forum
At a pivotal moment in Sudan's contemporary history, the political "centre" of the state is hidden behind a bloody scene disputed by armed fronts and conflicting authorities, while sovereign institutions are reeling under the weight of the conflict between the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces, and the state is absent as a unified entity. This accelerating disintegration of the manifestations of central authority does not merely reflect a circumstantial collapse in governance but foreshadows a structural transformation of the nature of the state itself. Sudan, in its current conflicts, seems to have entered a phase of "forced decentralisation," where governance has become distributed. Between military forces, armed movements, tribal leaders, and local civilian administrations--each claiming a fait accompli fueled by geography, weapons, and vacuum.
This scene goes beyond the transient security or political description, raising an existential question: Is what we are witnessing a slide towards "Somalisation," that is, towards a type of disjointed state shared by local authorities and warlords? Or does Sudan, despite this apparent fragmentation, still have opportunities to rebuild a unified sovereign status, even if through new forms of decentralised or consensual governance?
This analytical reading attempts to trace the dynamics of multiple authorities in Sudan, in the context of the disintegration of the central state and the disappearance of its monopoly on violence and decision-making, shedding light on the alternative models of governance emerging in the absence of the state, and the structural consequences of this on the unity of the country, the functions of the state, and the meaning of sovereignty itself.
From the capital (centre) to the periphery: how was power distributed in Sudan?
Since the outbreak of war on April 15, 2023, between the Sudanese army led by Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan and the Rapid Support Forces led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo "Hemedti", the capital, Khartoum, has witnessed an unprecedented collapse in its administrative, military and civil structure, as it quickly turned into a theater for direct fighting, and then into an abandoned city dominated by the authority of arms, not the authority of the state. As the center disintegrated, local power centers expanded across Sudan, filling the political and security vacuum, and establishing their own power-based powers. Armed and tribal, revolutionary, or regional legitimacy.
In the west of the country, the RSF controls large parts of the Darfur region, establishing semi-autonomous forms of governance, taxing forms of "royalties" in exchange for false protection, persecution, harassment and bullying, managing border crossings, and even appointing civilian officials in some areas, very similar to the alternative governance models that emerged in Somalia after the collapse of the Siad Barre regime, or in Libya after the fall of Gaddafi. In the east of the country, the army command is stationed in the city of Port Sudan, which manages the remaining state ministries and semi-central institutions, is in a position that expresses an "exiled" authority that controls the name of the state without actually controlling it and its capital.
In addition to these two military poles, power is effectively distributed among other parties, as the armed movements that signed the Juba Peace Agreement retain significant influence, albeit qualitatively, in Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile, and have field forces and political leaders, some of whom hold leadership and sovereign positions in the Port Sudan government, while others take independent or vacillating positions. Also, some areas of Sudan--especially in the north and west of the country--have witnessed a remarkable return of the influence of native administrations and tribal leaders, which now manage security and services, and resolve conflicts by means of traditional, in the complete absence of official institutions.
According to analyses published in the American journal Foreign Policy, the current Sudanese scene represents a "gradual dismantling of central authority" that reproduces power on local, clan, and security bases, reminiscent of failed decentralised state models, in which local units dominate at the expense of the inclusive state.
State Disintegration and Erosion of Sovereignty: Has Sudan Really Entered the Phase of Disintegrating State? Or Somalisation?
The decline of the status in Sudan is not purely an administrative imbalance or circumstantial turmoil, but rather a deep deviation in the function of the state itself, as a sovereign entity that monopolises the tools of violence, regulates the political space, and guarantees the unity of the land and population. What we are witnessing today is a gradual shift towards a disintegrating state model, where formal structures are replaced by multiple centers of influence, many of which reproduce power based on tribal or regional loyalty or according to the logic of armed force.
In this context, it may be tempting to use the term "Somalisation" to refer to this pattern of collapse, but this analogy, while analytical, may not surround the complexities of the Sudanese case. While Somalia has experienced the sudden collapse of a centralised system, Sudan is slipping down a gradual trajectory, fueled by accumulations of structural divisions, local conflicts, and multiple actors, as well as complex regional and international roles.
According to a report by Internation Crises Group, Sudan is today facing "one of the most serious cases of sovereignty decline in contemporary Africa", where the authority of the central state is eroded, not by a total collapse, but as a result of the distribution of sovereignty tools to non-state forces that exercise sovereign roles, ranging from imposing collection, managing services, regulating borders, and sometimes direct coordination with international parties through regional corridors and supervision.
The most dangerous thing about this transformation is not just a political or military division, but a redefinition of the state itself: from an entity that monopolises sovereignty to an authoritarian space shared by local forces that act like mini states within the mother state.
The Regional and International Role: How Has the Outside Contributed to the Dismantling of the Interior?
The disintegration of the Sudanese state was not only the result of internal factors, but regional and international interactions played a very influential role in accelerating the collapse and perpetuating the logic of war instead of the logic of the state. Since the outbreak of the recent conflict, the calculations of external actors have overlapped with the interests of local parties, and the Sudanese geography has turned into an open theater for interlocutor conflicts, competing interests, and undeclared interventions.
The UAE is at the forefront of regional players linked to financial and logistical support for the RSF, as part of its regional strategy that relies on the support of local proxies to enhance influence in vital areas such as the Red Sea and its African extension. On the other hand, Egypt is trying to preserve the Sudanese army as a traditional strategic ally, based on water security considerations in the Renaissance Dam file, and its security perspective that is apprehensive about the possibility of the expansion of irregular forces on its southern border.
Russia, on the other hand, stands out through its semi-declared relationship with the Wagner Group, which has been active in Sudan for years through the gateway to gold and security support, and has established a pattern of gray partnership with non-state actors. BBC and Reuters reports, as well as academic publications by Chatham House and Carnegie Middle East Centre, have documented Russia's growing influence, particularly in Darfur, through local gold smuggling and conflict financing networks.
In contrast to these competing axes, international organisations and UN institutions seemed unable to formulate an effective political or humanitarian approach, as initiatives such as the "Jeddah talks" failed to stabilise any permanent ceasefire, while the UN role in warning statements declined without actual tools of intervention or deterrence, in light of the division of the Security Council, and the decline of Sudan's priorities in the agenda of major powers.
These data show that the disintegration of the state in Sudan cannot be understood in isolation from the regional and international context, where the outside was not just a spectator, but - to varying degrees - a partner in producing fragility, promoting division, and framing power outside the central state.
The Future of the State in Sudan: Is There Any Prospect for Rebuilding?
In the midst of multi-level collapse, the fundamental question remains urgent: Can the Sudanese state be revived as a unified entity? Or has the country entered an irreversible phase of political and territorial fragmentation, in which power is re-engineered on the basis of local power centers, governed by networks of interests, and the logic of control rather than the logic of legitimacy?
In theory, the history of the Sudanese state, despite its complexities, provides room for recovery and reconstruction, especially in light of what is known as "post-conflict state formations", in which disjointed states witness a gradual return to the center through negotiating or regional arrangements that reproduce the state differently. But this possibility is conditional on several factors:
First: A comprehensive and permanent cessation of the war, a condition that is still elusive, in the absence of political will of the conflicting parties, and the transformation of the political economy of the war into a resource of power and influence.
Second: An inclusive national will that transcends the logic of military victory and victory and is based on the principle of redefining the state not as a booty or a tool of domination, but as a social contract that guarantees fair participation in power and wealth.
Third: Serious regional and international guarantees, not limited to supporting relief and humanitarian aid, but also engaged in engineering a political solution based on legitimacy, accountability, and rebuilding state institutions, away from the axes of alignment that deepened the crisis.
According to a paper by The United States Institute of Peace, Sudan needs "an inclusive political process that redefines the relationship between the center and the periphery, lays new foundations for local governance, without perpetuating secession or undermining the unity of the state."
But the biggest challenge in Sudan remains the absence of an inclusive national actor. The political scene after the revolution, then the coup, and then the war produced conflicting and dispersed forces, some of which compete for legitimacy and lack an integrated strategic vision for the next state.
The future of the state in Sudan will be determined not only by the military balance of power, but also by the ability of the Sudanese, with their various components, to move beyond the logic of "power as a privilege" to "the state as a common project." This transformation, while seemingly remote, remains a condition for Sudan's survival as a state and not just as a geography.
In a dramatic development that redraws the conflict in Sudan, Port Sudan--the interim administrative capital and seat of the internationally recognised government--witnessed drone strikes targeting vital facilities and sovereign headquarters. These attacks, which were not known on this scale in the east of the country before, represented a qualitative turning point in the course of the battle, and showed the breadth of targeting and the advancement of the capabilities of the other side, undermining the assumptions of "safe haven" in the east, and increasing the fragility of the central authority there.
But what is more striking than the attack itself is the silence of influential regional and international powers, or something like an organised "non-response." Some analysts, as indicated by analyses published in Middle East Eye and the Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, argued that this silence is neither inattention nor neutrality, but rather part of an undeclared strategy to pressure the Sudanese military institution to push it towards negotiations after adhering to the option of military resolution and rejecting any comprehensive political solutions. Port Sudan, despite being the official seat of government, has not enjoyed any belt. Political protection or overt support from its regional allies, which is read as an implicit hint: either compromise or more strategic nudity.
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But this equation--which is based on regional balances of power and interests--ignores the high price paid by Sudanese citizens. As marches move in the sky to change the balance of power, the tragedies of the displaced, refugees and displaced persons, who have been expelled from their homes and forced to cross borders, or take refuge in areas where there are no minimum necessities of life, are increasing on the ground. These are the weakest link in the chain of conflict, they have no voice in conferences or attendance in negotiating rooms, yet they are the ones who pay the full cost.
Conclusion
Between the question of the state and the question of survival
What Sudan is witnessing today cannot be reduced to a war between two armed parties, nor even a power struggle; it is a deep structural crisis that affects the idea of the state itself: how is it built? And to whom is it built? Who has the right to represent it, shape its contours, and protect its internal and external borders? The absence of status, the multiplicity of powers, the erosion of sovereignty, and the overlap of local, regional, and international actors are all not fleeting symptoms, but rather indicators of a profound transformation in the Sudanese political structure, threatening the existence of the state as a regulating framework for society.
In this context, traditional solutions are not enough, nor are formal compromises useful, unless they are accompanied by a national vision that redefines the state not as a center that subjugates the periphery, but as a participatory space that expresses pluralism and does not suppress it. Sudan needs more than a ceasefire, it needs reconciliation with itself, with its history, with its margins, and with its citizens, for whom the state has become either a weapon in their faces, or a distant shadow that does not protect from heat or cold.
If the drones have arrived in Port Sudan, this not only foreshadows the spread of fire to the rest of the center, but also recreates the most important question: Will the state remain in Sudan as an entity? Or are we going to redefine it as a conflicting geography under the management of multiple authorities, which govern but are not represented, controlled, and not united? In answering this question, the future of Sudan is determined, not only as a republic, but as a viable idea, or as an entity that is redrawn from the outside, in the name of the interior, in the absence of the real voice of the interior: the homeland and the citizen!
This report is prepared by Amjad Sharaf al-Din al-Makki of Al-Sudani Newspaper and published via the platforms of Sudan Media Forum member organisations to shed light on the situation in Sudan.
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